经济理论与经济管理

• 理论探索 • 上一篇    下一篇

中国信贷歧视的福利成本*

肖争艳1,郭豫媚1,郭俊杰3   

  1. 1  中国人民大学;  2  美国印第安纳大学伯明顿分校经济系
  • 出版日期:2015-10-16 发布日期:2015-10-26
  • 基金资助:

    本文得到中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目成果(批准号2013030249)的资助。

THE WELFARE COST OF CREDIT DISCRIMINATION IN CHINA

XIAO Zheng-yan-1,GUO Yu-mei-1,GUO Jun-jie-2   

  1. 1. Renmin University of China; 2. Indiana University Bloomington, USA
  • Online:2015-10-16 Published:2015-10-26

摘要:

国有企业与民营企业之间的信贷歧视是中国经济转型过程中所特有的现象。本文构建了一个具有信贷歧视的动态随机一般均衡模型,以计算中国信贷歧视的福利成本。计算结果表明,信贷歧视大约会使整体社会的福利损失增加62%,其原因在于信贷歧视加剧了民营企业的产出波动并进而放大了通胀波动。本文进一步对比了不同货币政策下的福利损失,发现信贷歧视均会产生福利成本。据此,本文认为信贷歧视必须予以破除,从而消除信贷歧视带来的福利成本。

关键词: 信贷歧视 , 福利成本 , 金融加速器 , 货币政策

Abstract:

The stateowned enterprises and private enterprises credit discrimination is a unique phenomenon in the process of china s economic transformation. Based on the financial accelerator models, this paper incorporates enterprise heterogeneity and a banking sector into a newKeynesian DSGE model to study the social welfare loss caused by credit discrimination. The numerical analysis shows that credit discrimination would increase the social welfare loss by 62% because it amplifies privateowned enterprises  output volatility and propagates the inflation volatility. Moreover, this paper finds that credit discrimination would cause social welfare loss under different monetary policy regime. Finally, this paper concludes that to eliminate the welfare loss the government should remove the credit discrimination.

Key words: credit discrimination , welfare loss , financial accelerator , monetary policy