Abstract: Based on the twostage dynamic game model between the government and the enterprises under the decentralized system and the fixed effect model constructed on it, this paper verifies the relationship between the economic competitiveness of local governments and the actual tax burden of enterprises using the financial data of Ashare listed companies. The results show that when the local government faces more intense economic competition, the actual tax burden of listed companies in its jurisdiction is lower. Further analysis shows that there are significant regional, industrial and ownership heterogeneities in the tax reduction effect of local government economic competition on enterprises; Quantile regression shows that when enterprises are in different tax intensity, there are significant differences in the tax reduction effect of local government economic competition. In the new era of tax reduction and fee reduction  which is beneficial to enterprises, this paper has enlightenment significance for the implementation of tax reduction and fee reduction policies and the standardization of local government behavior in horizontal competition.

Key words:  , economic competition, corporate tax burden, twostage dynamic game, tax reduction and fee reduction

摘要： 本文基于分权体制下政企之间的两阶段动态博弈模型以及在此基础上构建的计量模型，将地级市之间经济竞争程度与A股非金融类上市公司数据相匹配，验证了地方政府经济竞争程度与企业实际税负之间的关系。研究结果表明，当地方政府所面临的经济竞争程度越激烈时，其辖区内上市公司的实际税负越低。进一步分析发现，地方政府经济竞争对辖区企业的减税效应存在显著的地区、产业和所有制异质性；分位数回归发现，辖区企业处于不同税负强度时，地方政府经济竞争的减税效应也存在明显差异。在当前减税降费、让利于企的新时代背景下，本文的研究对落实减税降费政策和规范横向竞争中地方政府行为具有启示意义。

关键词: 经济竞争, 企业税负, 两阶段动态博弈, 减税降费