Abstract: Collusion and M&As （mergers and acquisitions） are two alternative strategies for enterprises to acquire market power Chinas antitrust enforcement adopts the delegated model，and horizontal collusion cases mainly rely on provincial law enforcement agencies to investigate and punish，while M&A activities relies on the Antimonopoly Law Enforcement Agency under the State Council to conduct prior review Utilizing the manually constructed horizontal monopoly agreement enforcement database alongside M&As data of Chinese enterprises，this paper analyzes the relationship between the breakdown of collusion and subsequent M&A activities，employing a panel twoway fixed effects model for analysis The results are as follows
Firstly，the suppression of collusion by provincial law enforcement agency has a notable deterrent effect，which significantly increases the number of M&As initiated by enterprises in the province The regression results show that，on average，the number of monthly M&As initiated by provincial enterprises increased by about 38% due to the investigation of collusion cases by provincial antimonopoly law enforcement agency In other words，M&As become a strategic response of enterprises to the crackdown on collusion by the provincial law enforcement agency
Secondly，the institutional arrangement in China，which mainly relies on provincial law enforcement agencies to combat collusion，reveals regional and industrial heterogeneity in strategic M&A activities The empirical analysis highlights several key insights：（1） The breakdown of collusion significantly boosts the number of M&As within the same province and within the same industry However，the impact on crossprovince and crossindustry M&As is not significant Further empirical analysis which distinguishes collusive industries from noncollusive industries found that，the crackdown on collusive industries by the provincial law enforcement agency significantly encouraged enterprises in collusive industries to initiate more M&As （2） The breakdown of collusion does not have a crossprovincial deterrent effect，and the breakdown of collusion in one province does not significantly promote more M&As initiated by enterprises in the same （collusion） industry in other provinces （3） Considering the cost of M&As，the strategic response to anticollusion enforcement shows firm heterogeneity The suppression of collusion by provincial law enforcement agency encourages firms with a high solvency ratio to initiate more M&As，while those with a low solvency ratio do not
The main innovation of this paper is to discover the substitution of merger and acquisition for collusion under Chinas antimonopoly law enforcement delegated model，especially the substitution effect has regional and industry heterogeneity，which is mainly significant within the province and industry The conclusion of this paper has some policy implications for Chinas antimonopoly law enforcement Antimonopoly law enforcement agency needs to pay attention to the strategic response of enterprises to anticollusion policy

Key words: antitrust, institutional complementarity, anticollusion enforcement, merger review

摘要： 在反垄断执法授权模式下，中国以省级执法机关为主查处合谋案件。本文结合手动构建的横向垄断协议执法数据和中国企业并购数据，使用面板数据双向固定效应模型分析了省级反垄断执法机关打击合谋与企业并购之间的关联性。研究发现：（1）打击合谋显著提升了本省企业发起的月度并购次数。这种策略性并购具有区域和行业异质性。（2）打击合谋更倾向于提升本省企业发起的同省并购、同行业并购、本省合谋行业的并购。（3）打击合谋不存在跨省威慑效应，本省执法机关查处合谋并未显著激励其他省份同一（合谋）行业发起更多并购。（4）考虑到并购成本，偿债能力高的企业更倾向于增加并购次数。本文在中国反垄断执法授权制度下发现了并购对合谋的替代性，尤其是该替代效应具有区域和行业异质性，主要在本省、本行业范围内显著。本文研究对我国反垄断执法具有一定政策启示，反垄断执法机关需要关注企业对打击合谋政策的策略性反应。

关键词: 反垄断, 制度互补性, 反合谋执法, 并购审查