Abstract: This paper examines the historical evolution，institutional characteristics，and academic debates surrounding the tax-sharing system reform，aiming to clarify the reforms institutional effects on local government debt governance and to outline potential pathways for further reform Amidst the pursuit of highquality development，it is imperative to advance local government debt governance It not only concerns the strategic outlook of preventing and resolving major economic and financial risks，it also underscores its theoretical value There are practical significances in nurturing financial resources and fostering new development impetus Furthermore，it plays a significant role in constructing a highlevel socialist market economy system
It posits that the tax-sharing system reform effectively leverages the “dual incentives” of central and local governments，thereby laying the groundwork for a decentralized governance framework aligned with the socialist market economy From an institutional economics perspective，the reform of the taxsharing system primarily influences the policy direction of local government debt governance through fiscal and political incentives This paper aims to address three key academic debates Firstly，it argues that the financing patterns of local government debt prior to the taxsharing system reform do not diminish the institutional impacts brought about by the reform Secondly，it suggests that vertical transfer payments not only fail to mitigate the fiscal incentives of the taxsharing system reform but also exacerbate the “common pool” effect on local government debt governance Thirdly，following the implementation of the taxsharing system reform，there has been a notable shift in the motivational dynamics driving local officials towards debt financing，transitioning from “a profitdriven orientation” to “one predominantly focused on risk mitigation and avoidance strategies” Furthermore，this paper analyzes the implications of the taxsharing system reform，finding that it effectively harnesses the “dual incentives” of central and local governments，thereby encouraging local governments to issue debt for the construction of municipal infrastructure By integrating administrative mobilization capabilities with market enhancement abilities，the reform has spurred considerable infrastructure development at the local level However，the focus on “respond to superiors” rather than “respond to subordinates” in the responsibility constraint mechanism has also led to the continuous generation，expansion，and concealed accumulation of local government debt risks 
This paper provides strategic reform directions for fiscal power division，authority allocation，administrative supervision，and market constraints to promote the taxsharing reform and local government debt governance under the context of highquality development，with the aim of building a highlevel socialist market economy system

Key words: tax-sharing reform, local government debt governance, fiscal incentive, political incentive

摘要： 本文通过回顾分税制改革的历史沿革、制度特征和学术争鸣，试图厘清分税制改革对地方政府债务治理的影响机制和改革路径。本文认为，分税制改革有效发挥了中央和地方“两个积极性”，初步构建起同社会主义市场经济体制相适应的分权治理框架。从影响效果来看，分税制改革引领的“双重激励”将地方政府行政动员能力和市场增进能力有效结合起来，激励地方政府举债筹资建设了大量市政基础设施；但侧重“事上”而非“安下”的责任约束机制也导致地方政府债务风险不断衍生泛化、变相积聚。本文为推进高质量发展背景下的分税制改革和地方政府债务治理、构建高水平社会主义市场经济体制提供了财权划分、事权配置、行政监察、市场约束等改革战略取向。

关键词: 分税制改革, 地方政府债务治理, 财政激励, 政治激励