Abstract: China has implemented an early and genderspecific legal retirement age，with men retiring at 60，female workers at 50，and female cadres at 55 However，due to the need to alleviate the strain on pension funds，delaying retirement has become inevitable Nevertheless，many individuals are opposed to this change as it may jeopardize their own pension benefits Moreover，in China，the interplay of labor market disparities and pension system design leads to the transformation of biological and labor market differences between genders into genderbased variations in pension benefits Therefore，finding ways to incentivize individuals towards delayed retirement through system design while promoting gender equality in pension benefits is a crucial issue for Chinas delayed retirement policies
Using the 2020 CFPS microdata and individual microsimulation methods，this paper comprehensively simulates and compares three types of individual pension benefits:gross social security wealth，net social security wealth，and net present value of retirement It examines these benefits under both the current system and eight designs of delayed retirement systems The study determines the optimal retirement age based on four criteria:the accumulative value，gross peak value，net peak value，and option value Additionally，it analyzes how to incentivize individuals to choose delayed retirement through system design while promoting gender equality in individual pension benefits The paper also investigates changes in gains and losses of individual pension benefits as well as individual retirement choices in delayed retirement scenarios Lastly，it analyzes the degree and causes of gender inequality in pension benefits using OAXACARIF decomposition method
This study reveals several findings:firstly，the current system exhibits an early retirement incentive，leading individuals to opt for earlier retirement；secondly，compared to alternative delayed retirement systems，the flexible delayed retirement system with laddering incentives and penalties reduces the proportion of individuals from different genders experiencing benefit loss during delayed retirement Moreover，all individuals within this system can retire at their optimal age Lastly，there is a notable presence of gender inequality and discrimination in pension benefits under the existing system In comparison to other designs of delayed retirement systems，the flexible delayed retirement system with laddering incentives and penalties proves more effective in mitigating gender disparities and promoting gender equality in pension benefits
The findings of this paper provide valuable insights for the design of China‘s delayed retirement systemFirstly，instead of solely increasing the statutory retirement age，it is essential to incorporate incentive measures for delayed retirement into the existing system design Failing to do so would hinder the modification of retirement incentives provided by the current system design and consequently impede the successful implementation of a delayed retirement system Secondly，adopting a flexible delayed retirement system with laddering incentives and penalties respects individual choices while safeguarding pension benefits and motivating individuals to opt for delaying their retirement Thirdly，attention should be given to addressing gender inequality in pension benefits within the design of the delayed retirement system，aiming to reduce disparities and discrimination caused by its structure
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Key words: delayed retirement, gender differences, pension benefits, retirement decisions

摘要： 明晰不同性别个体在延迟退休中的福利损益，是优化设计延迟退休制度的关键。本文使用微观模拟和OAXACARIF分解方法，模拟了现行制度以及八种延迟退休制度下个体的养老金总财富、养老金净财富、退休总净现值三种养老金福利，并通过模拟养老金总财富累计值、养老金总财富峰值、养老金净财富峰值、期权价值确定了个体最优的退休年龄选择。研究发现：现行制度存在提前退休激励；阶梯奖惩的弹性延迟退休制度具有延迟退休激励效果；现行制度下个体养老金福利存在的性别不平等和性别歧视可以通过延迟退休缓解。据此，本文认为在延迟退休制度设计中需要加入激励措施、采取具有阶梯奖惩措施的弹性延迟退休方案、减少养老金福利的性别不平等和性别歧视。

关键词: 延迟退休, 性别差异, 养老金福利, 退休决策