Abstract: This paper studies the individual governance effect of audit supervision on stateowned enterprises (SOEs) from the perspective of the excess perk of local SOEs' executives. Based on the data of local listed SOEs from 2007 to 2017 and taking the supervision background of the local audit leaders as a starting point, this paper empirically examines the individual governance effect of audit supervision on the excess perk of local SOEs' executives under strict supervision atmosphere. It is found that the supervision background of the local audit leaders can significantly inhibit the excess perk of local SOE's executives, and this result is mainly reflected in the strict supervision period starting from 2013. The above results are robust to a variety of endogenous and robustness tests. Further analyses indicate that the negative relationship between the supervision background of the local audit leaders and the excess perk of local SOEs' executives is not only affected by the motivation and ability of audit supervision, but also affected by the internal and external governance mechanism of local SOEs. Finally, the supervision background of the local audit leaders effectively alleviates the firm value impairment and stock price crash risk caused by the excess perk of local SOEs' executives.

Key words: audit supervision, government audit, individual effect, SOEs' governance, excess perk

摘要： 本文基于地方国有企业高管超额在职消费的视角研究审计监督对国有企业发挥的个体治理效应。采用2007—2017年地方国有上市公司样本，本文以地方审计机关负责人的监督背景为切入点实证考察“严监管”背景下审计监督对地方国有企业高管超额在职消费的个体治理效应。研究发现，地方审计机关负责人的监督背景能够显著抑制地方国有企业高管超额在职消费，并且这一现象主要体现在2013年开始的“严监管”时期。这一结果在多种内生性和稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步研究发现，地方审计机关负责人的监督背景与地方国有企业高管超额在职消费的负向关系不仅受到审计监督的动机和能力的影响，而且受到国有企业内外部治理机制的影响。最终，地方审计机关负责人的监督背景能够有效缓解地方国有企业因高管超额在职消费引致的公司价值减损和股价崩盘风险。

关键词: 审计监督, 政府审计, 个体效应, 国企治理, 超额在职消费