Abstract: Regions across China strive to catch up and overtake one another. Under economic development patterns and regional tax competition with Chinese characteristics, FDI attraction game among local governments easily evolved into land price war in the form of offering cheap land and preferential land supply policies. To mitigate the land resource waste problem caused by such game among local governments, the central government imposed a land quota system (Red line of 1.8 billion mu farmland policy). Employing new economic geography model, this paper analyzes the impact of the land quota on interregional FDI competition. It is found that, although the land quota cannot completely overcome the efficiency loss related to insufficient agglomeration caused by the interregional competition, it is helpful to mitigate the problem related to the race to the bottom game. A dually coordinated land supply and revenuesharing system managed by central government will overcome both issues of insufficient agglomeration and race to the bottom game, enhance interregional harmonization development, and allow all citizens to more equally benefit from national economic development. At the ongoing transitional period, it is urgent to establish a nationwide land quota trading system to facilitate crossregional transactions of land resources.

Key words: land quota, FDI competition by land, differential rent, interregional coordinated development

摘要： 在我国区域间“你追我赶”式的经济发展模式和中国特色的地区间税收竞争环境下，地方政府招商引资常演变成以地价、优惠政策为主的价格战，造成土地资源严重透支，18亿亩耕地红线应运而生。运用新经济地理学模型分析“红线”对地方政府土地招商博弈的政策效应，本文发现尽管“红线”无法根除此种招商博弈造成集聚不足的效率损失问题，但有助于减少地方政府“竞次”行为。如果中央政府对土地供给和收益双统筹配置，既能解决集聚不足和“竞次”行为，也能使全体国民更均等地共享经济发展成果，促进区域协调，实现社会公平。就现阶段而言，建立和完善全国统一的建设用地指标跨省交易市场体系是当务之急。

关键词: 耕地红线, 土地招商, 级差地租, 区域统筹发展