Abstract: Based on the revolutionary game of duplicative dynamic and through the establishment of an evolutionary game model of innovative behavioral strategies, this paper gives the matrix expression and trace expression corresponding to the equilibrium points of the duplicative power system, and discusses the decisionmaking process with this equilibrium. We propose that the relative net payment under different strategies determines the evolutionary stability strategy of the system. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game results from the three aspects of the initial cost, expected excess return and risk loss, and reveals the transmission mechanism of the tradeoff. Enterprises and governments should continue to learn and adapt to changes in the market and competitive environment and take active strategies to play a synergistic role in promoting innovation.

Key words: small and mediumsized enterprises , independent innovation , followup innovation , policy incentives , transmission mechanism , evolutionary game

摘要： 本文基于复制动态演化博弈理论，对中小企业创新行为选择和政府政策激励策略进行演化博弈分析，给出了复制动态系统均衡点对应的矩阵行列式和迹表达式，讨论了均衡点稳定性所对应的博弈双方决策过程，以及不同情形下的相对净支付决定的系统演化稳定策略。从双方的初始成本、预期超额收益、风险损失三个方面对演化博弈结果进行分析推论，揭示了策略权衡选择的传导机制。进而对不同初始状态下趋向稳定演化策略的路径进行了仿真检验，并用经验事实进行了论证。在此基础上，本文提出了政府的激励政策如何同中小企业自主创新行为形成协同效应的启示与建议。

关键词: 中小企业 , 自主创新 , 跟随创新 , 政策激励 , 传导机制 , 演化博弈