The intervention effect of government subsidy on capital market is a hot topic that scholars urgently need to solve. Based on government subsidies, this paper

investigates the pricing efficiency of private placement and the economic logic behind private placement proceeds from the primary and secondary markets respectively. The stochastic frontier analysis method is used to analyse the Ashare listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2017 that received government subsidies and implemented private placement. The empirical results show as follows: (1) The issue of directional issuance price premium phenomenon, secondary offerings listed after the premium phenomenon also exists, government subsidies contributed to the extent of the directional issuance price than its intrinsic value, resulting in reduced pricing efficiency, and this phenomenon in stateowned enterprises is more serious. (2) The more serious the pricing bubble is, the higher the revenue is. At the same time the government subsidies for the purchase benefits will have a positive impact, and this phenomenon is more prominent in the stateowned enterprises. Furthermore, the path test results show that the government subsidy is mainly dependent on earnings management, independent innovation and the growth of individual stocks. The results suggest that government subsidies can be dissimilated as hidden tools for manipulating share prices, distorting the incentives for government intervention and making it less effective than it was intended. The research conclusion provides a new perspective for solving the attribution problem of private placement income and a new method for reasonably evaluating the microgovernance effect caused by government subsidy policy.

政府补助效果是学者高度重视的焦点话题。本文以政府补助为切入点，从一级市场、二级市场分别考察定向增发新股的定价效率以及定向增发收益背后的经济逻辑，并采用随机前沿分析法对2007—2017年间获得政府补助且实施定向增发新股的沪深A 股上市公司进行实证分析。结果发现：定向增发新股发行存在溢价现象，新股上市后也存在溢价现象，政府补助加剧了溢价程度，进而导致定价效率降低，且在国有企业中更严重；发行定价泡沫越严重，定向增发收益越高，同时政府补助对定向增发收益能产生积极影响，且在国有企业中更显著。路径检验结果发现：政府补助作用于定向增发收益可能依赖盈余管理、自主创新以及个股成长这三条路径。上述结果表明，政府补助可能被异化为操纵股价的隐形工具，导致政府补助效果“事与愿违”。