MANAGERIAL POWER，INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MONITORING AND CORPORATE RISKTAKING#br#

Abstract

Abstract:

Using a sample of 2005—2014 Chinese A share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges，this paper investigates the impact of managerial power on corporate risktakingThe results show that the greater the power of management，the more obvious the tendency of risk aversion and the companies risktaking level becomes relatively lowEffective internal and external monitoring mechanisms can weaken the influence of managerial power on corporate risktakingChannel analysis reveals that managerial power reduces corporate risktaking by weakening companies financing level，but it shows no significant impact on corporate investment activitiesThis paper extends the literature on the economic significance of managerial power and the determinants of corporate risktakingThis paper has significant practical values on guiding managers to take risks positively，strengthening the construction of internal and external governance system and safeguarding minority interests of listed companies

Key words: managerial power , corporate risktaking , internal control , external monitoring , corporate governance

摘要：

本文以2005—2014年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本，采用主成分分析法构建管理层权力的衡量指标，实证检验管理层权力对企业风险承担的影响。研究结果表明，管理层权力越大，风险规避的倾向越明显，企业风险承担水平越低；良好的内外部监督机制能弱化管理层权力对企业风险承担的抑制作用；渠道测试表明，管理层权力通过削弱企业的融资水平规避风险，而对企业投资无显著影响。本文拓展了管理层权力的经济后果及企业风险承担影响因素领域的文献，对引导管理者积极承担风险、加强上市公司内外部治理体系建设、维护中小股东权益具有重要的现实意义。

关键词: 管理层权力 , 企业风险承担 , 内部控制 , 外部监督 , 公司治理

SONG Jianbo1,WEN Wen1,WANG Dehong2,SHEN Wei1. MANAGERIAL POWER，INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MONITORING AND CORPORATE RISKTAKING#br#[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management.

宋建波1,文雯1,王德宏2,申伟1. 管理层权力、内外部监督与企业风险承担*[J]. 经济理论与经济管理.

[1]	JIA Jianfeng, LIU Dingming, LI Dongxu. DOES ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—— Evidence from Chinas AShare Listed Companies [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2022, 42(6): 79-96.
[2]	JIANG Fuxiu, WANG Ying. THE LOGIC OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES: FROM NATIONAL GOVERNANCE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2021, 41(6): 4-21.
[3]	ZHI Xiaoqiang, WANG Yao, HOU Deshuai. CAN STOCK MARKET LIBERALIZATION CURB CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE——A Quasiexperiment of ShanghaiHong Kong Stock Connect Program [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2021, 41(2): 70-84.
[4]	YI Zhihong, DING Yanping, CHEN Qinyuan, YANG Shengzhi. INVESTOR RELATIONS MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE RISKTAKING [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2020, 40(11): 4-20.
[5]	LIU Meng,SHI Jinchuan,LUO Deming. MEDIA COVERAGE AND CORPORATE R&D INVESTMENT——Evidence from Listed Companies in China [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2019, 39(3): 18-32.
[6]	SHU Jiaxian,YI Miaomiao. CUMULATIVE VOTING AND THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2019, 39(11): 68-81.
[7]	ZHU Wenyu,LIU Erzhuo. CUMULATIVE VOTING AND THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2019, 39(11): 32-49.
[8]	WANG Liang-cheng1，CHEN Han-wen2. THE ROLE OF INTERNAL CONTROL IN THE SEO: CHINESE EVIDENCE [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2017, 37(7): 17-30.
[9]	YUAN Rong-Li-1,CHEN Li-Ming-2,WEN Wen-1. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF AUDITORS REPORTS ON INTERNAL CONTROL ——Based on Propensity Score Matching and Differenceindifference Approaches [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2014, 34(6): 71-83.
[10]	HE Qing,LI Dong-Xu. DOES FIRMS IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK AFFECT CEO FORCED TURNOVER ——Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2014, 34(12): 93-106.
[11]	HE Qing. INSIDER TRADING AND MARKET RETURN: THE EVIDENCE FROM CHINA [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2012, 32(2): 61-70.
[12]	MENG Xiang-Xia, XU Ling. LEGAL MECHANISM, THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE——Based on the Analysis of Chongqing Beer's Hepatitis B Vaccine Events [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2012, 31(11): 96-103.
[13]	YI Zhi-hong, LI Yan-li, GAO Wei. MARKETIZATION,INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND COMPENSATION INCENTIVE [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2011, (10): 75-83.
[14]	GAO Lei, ZHANG Jie. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,EARNINGS MANAGEMENT,AND FIRM GROWTH [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2009, (12): 53-59.
[15]	HONG Gong-xiang. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES REFORM IN 30 YEARS [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2008, (11): 36-42.