Abstract: This present paper is directed toward the mitigation mechanism of information asymmetry problem in P2P lending from the perspective of signaling transmission and bilateral reputation on the basis of“Renrendai” data. The empirical results show that the mechanism of education signal and bilateral reputation of P2P lending can help alleviate the degree of information asymmetry, improve the efficiency of financial services, promote the rational allocation of resources and reduce the moral hazard after financing. There is an asymmetric alternative relationship between borrowers credit signaling and bilateral reputation. The high reputation effect for the loweducated borrower is relatively higher. Therefore the loweducated borrower is more inclined to build his own high reputation to make up for inadequacy of credibility signaling. However, with the enhancement of borrowers education, the asymmetric effect disappears. The further study found there is a big regional difference in the case of easing the information asymmetry problem. This paper provides a new way to release the financing plight for the long tail crowds. 

Key words: P2P lending , information asymmetry , signaling, bilateral reputation , credit constraints

摘要： 本文借助于“人人贷”平台的微观数据从信号传递和双边声誉两个视角研究了网络借贷平台信息不对称问题的缓解机制。研究发现网络借贷平台的学历信号和双边声誉机制有助于减缓信息不对称程度，提高金融服务效率，增进资源的合理配置，降低融资后的道德风险。同时，本文还发现借款人的学历信号和双边声誉存在非对称的替代关系，高声誉更能弥补低学历借款人信誉信号的不足，因此低学历借款人更有激励建立自身的高声誉，但是随着借款人学历的提升，该非对称效应消失。进一步研究发现，学历信号和双边声誉机制在缓解借贷双方的信息不对称问题上存在较大的区域差异。本文的研究对于缓解“长尾人群”的融资约束提供了一种新的思路。

关键词: 网络借贷 , 信息不对称 , 信号传递 , 双边声誉 , 信贷约束