Abstract: Based on the research methods of institutional economics and contract theory，this paper embeds some measures of central government into the land price decision function of local governmentIt can support comparative institutional analysis for different governance strategies of central government on competition of attracting business and investments among local governmentsIn view of the fact that the local governments follow the principle of maintaining equal marginal revenue in the land transfer for different industries，a moderate increase in the expropriation price of agricultural land and tax burden of service industry，can compress the impulse and behavior space of local government on attract lowend manufacturingFurthermore，the incentive industrial tax policy may be valid only when it is directed to the taxpayers who are renting rather than owning the propertyGovernment can adjust the structure of fiscal revenue by increasing the tax burden of residential real estate owners and reducing fee for land use，and continue to maintain the incentive tax policy on the knowledge and technology intensive taxpayers who often rent rather hold property

Key words: comparative institutional analysis , contract theory , land price competition

摘要： 本文借鉴制度经济学研究方法，将中央政府的若干治理手段嵌入到地方政府地价决定函数中，对财政收入最大化与地方政府地价竞争的治理策略做比较制度分析。本文认为，地方政府在地价决定中具有产业间边际财政总收入均等化的动机，适度提高农地征收价格以及服务业税负，有助于压缩地方政府的恶性竞争空间。产业性税收优惠政策可能只对那些租赁而不是持有地产的经营者才有效，可以考虑适度增加住宅所有者的税负来实现“增税降费”的财政收入结构调整，同时继续维持对营业场所以租赁为主的知识密集型服务业的税收优惠。

关键词: 比较制度分析 , 招商引资 , 地价竞争