Economic Theory and Business Management
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YING Shan-shan,ZHU Bei,GAO Jie
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应珊珊,朱蓓,高洁
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Abstract: The formation mechanism of slotting allowance and the regulation have been a dilemma for a long time This paper incorporates the manufactures investment and externality between manufactures into the Nash bargaining model over slotting fees, to see their influence on slotting allowance as well as the welfare effect of slotting allowance This paper shows that slotting allowance is not only affected by the relative bargaining power between manufactures and retailers, but also by manufactures effort costs and externality Though manufactures have no bargaining power, the retailer may also pay the franchise fee to the manufacture to encourage its effort Moreover, in some condition slotting allowance will harm consumer welfare Therefore, it is reasonable to treat cases of slotting allowance as behaviors of abusing market power and apply ruleofreason into its judgment.
Key words: slotting allowance , Nash bargaining , investment effort , externality
摘要: 通道费的形成机理以及对其的规制政策一直是个未解的难题。本文在上游制造商之间的努力存在外部性的条件下考虑上游的投资决策,基于纳什不对称讨价还价模型考察了努力外部性、努力成本、相对谈判势力等因素对通道费的影响,以及通道费收取对生产投资的影响和福利效应。研究表明,通道费的形成不仅取决于制造商的相对谈判势力,而且取决于制造商投资努力的成本以及外部性的大小。即便制造商完全没有谈判势力,零售商也会选择向制造商支付特许经营费的方式激励制造商提供努力。此外,通道费在一定条件下可能会损害消费者福利,因而把通道费纳入滥用市场支配地位的行为范围,对其根据合理推断原则进行判别具有一定的必要性。
关键词: 通道费 , 纳什谈判 , 投资努力 , 外部性
YING Shan-shan,ZHU Bei,GAO Jie. THE MECHANISM OF SLOTTING ALLOWANCE WITH BARGAINING MODEL AND MANUFACTURES EFFORT[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management.
应珊珊,朱蓓,高洁. 基于制造商投资和讨价还价模型的零售通道费形成机理研究*[J]. 经济理论与经济管理.
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URL: http://jjll.ruc.edu.cn/EN/
http://jjll.ruc.edu.cn/EN/Y2016/V36/I12/83