Abstract: There is no independent legislative power of tax in China's local governments, but they still can take Chinesestyle tax competition through preferential corporate income tax. Based on the construction of provincial preferential corporate income tax measurement, this paper uses the spatial lag model of panel data to conclude that, there is complementary strategy type of tax competition between local governments in China, and the competition in normal preferential corporate income tax is more intense than real preferential tax. The central government should start from the nominal preferential corporate income tax, take measures to regulate corporate income tax competition behavior between local governments, but should also keep the continuity of government's preferential tax policy and its implementation effect.

Key words: local government , corporate income tax competition , normal preferential tax , real preferential tax

摘要： There is no independent legislative power of tax in China's local governments, but they still can take Chinesestyle tax competition through preferential corporate income tax. Based on the construction of provincial preferential corporate income tax measurement, this paper uses the spatial lag model of panel data to conclude that, there is complementary strategy type of tax competition between local governments in China, and the competition in normal preferential corporate income tax is more intense than real preferential tax. The central government should start from the nominal preferential corporate income tax, take measures to regulate corporate income tax competition behavior between local governments, but should also keep the continuity of government's preferential tax policy and its implementation effect.

关键词: local government , corporate income tax competition , normal preferential tax , real preferential tax