Abstract: This paper tested the relationships among marketization,institutional investors and executive compensation by studying Chinese A-share listed companies of 2003-2010.The research found that a significant positive relationship between pressure-resistant institutional investors' shareholdings and executive officers' pay-for-performance sensitivity.Further studies reported that marketization was an important factor which would affect institutional investors' governance effect.Pressure-resistant institutional investors could improve executive officers' pay-for-performance sensitivity only in the area of faster marketization.So it could be said that pressure-resistant institutional investors could play an active role in corporate governance,but marketization would restrict the governance role of pressure-resistant institutional investors.To solve the problem of corporate governance in China not only need to develop institutional investors,but also to improve institutional environment.

Key words: marketization, institutional investors, pay-for-performance sensitivity, corporate governance

摘要： 本文以沪深两市A股上市公司2003—2010年的数据作为研究样本,探讨了市场化进程、机构投资者与高管薪酬激励三者之间的关系。研究发现,压力抵制型机构投资者与高管薪酬—绩效敏感性显著正相关;市场化进程是影响机构投资者治理作用发挥的重要外部因素,在市场化进程相对较快的地区,压力抵制型机构投资者持股能够对上市公司高管薪酬—绩效敏感性起到促进作用;在市场化进程较慢的地区,压力抵制型机构投资者与高管薪酬—绩效敏感性无显著相关性。研究结果表明,压力抵制型机构投资者有利于公司治理的改善,但是,其积极治理效应的发挥受到市场化进程因素的限制。本文的政策含义在于,解决中国上市公司的治理问题,不仅要继续大力发展机构投资者,还要相应改善其所处的制度环境。

关键词: 市场化进程, 机构投资者, 薪酬—绩效敏感性, 公司治理