Abstract: In the circumstances of information asymmetry and incomplete contracts,the interest conflicts between self-benefit managers and shareholders lead to the managerial entrenchment behaviors,in which the managers strengthen their position and maximize their own effectiveness.This paper,based on the panel data of a sample of 6-year listed A-share companies(from 2003 to 2008),estimates the degree of managerial entrenchment and studies the relationship of managerial entrenchment and corporate performance by analyzing the eight factors selected from the manager's individual characteristics,the manager's incentive and the monitoring characteristics of manager.The research result indicates that the degree of managerial entrenchment may have a negative impact on corporate performance.The manager's age,education level,compensation and the independence of the board of directors may have a positive correlation with corporate performance;while the management tenure and the managerial ownership may have a negative impact on corporate performance.It also concludes that there is a U-shape relationship between the ownership concentration degree and corporate performance.

Key words: managerial entrenchment, manager’s characteristics, management incentive, management restraint, corporate performance

摘要： 在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突,引发了管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。本文从影响管理防御的管理者特征、管理者激励和管理者监督3个方面选择了8个变量,选取2003—2008年这6年连续上市的A股公司的面板数据,考察管理防御与公司业绩之间的关系。研究表明,管理者防御程度会对公司业绩产生负面影响,其中管理者年龄、管理者受教育水平、管理者薪酬和董事会独立性与上市公司业绩显著正相关,管理者任期、管理者持股比例对业绩有负面影响,股权集中度与公司业绩呈U型关系。

关键词: 管理防御, 管理者特征, 管理者激励, 管理者监督, 公司业绩