A STUDY ON THE MULTIPLE-EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HOLMSTROM TEAM INCENTIVE SCHEMES
YI Ding-hong1, PENG Peng2
1. School of Labor Relations and Human Resources, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China; 2. China National Gold Group Corporation, Beijing 100029, China
YI Ding-hong, PENG Peng. A STUDY ON THE MULTIPLE-EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HOLMSTROM TEAM INCENTIVE SCHEMES[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2010, (5): 65-72.
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