OUR PRIVATE-RAISING FUNDS:SIX BIG PROBLEMS AND PROPOSITINS

Abstract

Abstract: The greatest limitation of Chinese private-raising funds is the minimum yield,which is a huge hidden trouble.The operating of Chinese private-raising funds has great to do with the institutional defects of securities market,and will probably lead to the systematic risks of securities market.Therefor,certain rules and laws should be established so that private-raising funds be supervised,cleaned up,and standardized and systematic risks avoided.

Key words: private-raising fund,minimum yield, supervision

摘要： 中国私募基金最大的设计缺陷是保底收益率,正是这一点,给私募基金的运作埋下了巨大的隐患。中国私募基金的运作与证券市场的制度缺陷有着密切的联系,随着规模的不断扩大,有可能成为引导证券市场发生系统性风险的导火索。因此,现阶段应通过制定法律法规加强对私募基金的监管,对现有的私募基金进行清理、整顿和规范,防止系统性风险的发生,从而促进私募基金的规范化发展。

关键词: 私募基金, 保底收益率, 监管

CLC Number:

F830.91

HE Xiao-xing. OUR PRIVATE-RAISING FUNDS:SIX BIG PROBLEMS AND PROPOSITINS[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2001, (10): 35-40.

何孝星. 我国私募基金存在的六大问题及规范化建议[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2001, (10): 35-40.

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