Abstract: In the five years from 2016 to 2020, 780 of 832 national povertystricken counties have passed the special assessment organized by thirdparty organizations and got rid of the poverty hat. In the field evaluation, there are many positive interactions between the third party and multiple local participants, but it is difficult to say that the adverse response of some local stakeholders to the evaluation is a benign interaction. Adverse response refers to the negative response of poor counties to thirdparty assessment work through false cooperation, noncooperation, and even artificial obstacles during the exit process of poor county list. This kind of negative response not only leads the third party into the “low efficiency trap” and “double interest game trap”, but also makes the central government's desire to make up for the central governments poor governance information asymmetry through the third party in vain. Based on the Nash equilibrium theory, this paper analyzes the game among the third party, the local government and the poor families. Combined with the field data of the exit assessment of a poor county, it is found that some poor families and local government cadres tend to adopt the adverse strategy in the process of exit assessment of povertystricken counties. Through the analysis of the reasons for the nonbenign interaction among the local government, the poor families and the third party, the paper finally puts forward the policy suggestions of “restraining the local excessive adverse response and promoting the positive response”, so as to serve the construction of the acceptance mechanism of relative poverty governance in the stage of comprehensive rural revitalization.

Key words:  exit of poor counties, third party evaluation, adverse response, local strategies, Nash equilibrium theory

摘要： 在2016—2020五年间，832个国家级贫困县中共有780个通过第三方机构实施的专项评估而脱贫摘帽。在实地评估中，第三方评估机构与地方多元参评主体的良性互动很多。但一些地方利益主体对评估工作的逆向因应并不是一种良性互动。逆向因应是指在贫困县退出的第三方评估中，受评估地方通过虚假配合、不配合甚至人为设置障碍等方式对第三方评估工作的消极响应。这种消极响应使第三方评估机构步入“低效率陷阱”和“双重利益博弈陷阱”，也使中央通过第三方评估机构来弥补中央与地方贫困治理信息不对称的愿望落空。本文基于纳什均衡理论框架分析了第三方评估机构、地方政府、贫困户三者间的博弈，并结合某贫困县退出评估的田野调查资料，研究发现：贫困县退出评估的运行过程中，有部分贫困户和地方政府干部倾向于采用反评估的因应第三方策略。本文通过对地方政府与第三方评估机构非良性互动的原因分析，提出了“抑制地方政府逆向因应、促进正向因应”的政策建议，从而建立在乡村振兴战略下对贫困治理成效验收的有效机制。

关键词: 贫困县退出, 第三方评估, 逆向因应, 地方策略, 纳什均衡理论