Abstract: This paper investigates the motivations and effects of local stateowned enterprises holding commercial banks' ownership. First of all, this paper finds that compared with other stateowned enterprises, the stateowned enterprises whose actual controllers are local governments or local SASACs (Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) are more likely to hold ownership of commercial banks; moreover, they prefer to hold the ownership of commercial banks which are located in the same provinces or cities where the stateowned enterprises are registered. Second, this relationship is more prominent among the stateowned enterprises whose registration is provincial capitals, with lower level of marketization of the financial industry, or with younger governors. Third, after the issuance of policies to promote the development of the banking industry, the local stateowned enterprises have a higher probability of holding ownership of commercial banks. Last, based on the analysis of economic consequences, we find that holding commercial banks' ownership is conducive to promoting regional financial development and increasing the promotion of local officials. This study shows that the behavior of local SOEs holding commercial banks mainly reflects the motivation of local governments and officials.

Key words: local stateowned enterprises, holding banks, official promotion

摘要： 本文研究地方政府或地方国资委控股国有上市公司（地方国有上市公司）持股商业银行的动机和效应。研究发现，相比于其他国有上市公司，地方国有上市公司更偏好持股商业银行，且多为同地区的商业银行；当公司注册地为省会城市、金融业市场化水平较低、地方官员任职年龄较小时，上述关系更加显著；当政府发布相关促进银行业发展政策后，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的概率显著上升。除此之外，本文对经济后果进行分析发现，持股商业银行提升了地方金融业水平以及地方官员晋升概率。本文的研究结论表明，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的经济行为更多地反映了政府动机和地方官员晋升激励动机。

关键词: 地方国企, 持股银行, 官员晋升