经济理论与经济管理 ›› 2026, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (9): 39-55.

• 高质量发展研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

地方罚没收入依赖、营商环境与中小企业劳动雇佣规模

  

  1. 谢浥好、韩镕泽、代志新(通讯作者),中国人民大学财政金融学院,邮政编码:100872,电子信箱:dai@ruc.edu.cn;冯帆,对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院。

  • 出版日期:2026-09-15 发布日期:2026-09-22
  • 基金资助:
    本文得到国家自然科学基金面上项目(72273145)、中国人民大学2025年度拔尖创新人才培育资助计划成果的资助。

Local Dependence on Penalty Revenue, Business Environment and Labor Employment in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

  1. XIE Yihao1FENG Fan2HAN Rongze1DAI Zhixin1
    (1. School of Finance,Renmin University of China;
    2. School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics)

  • Online:2026-09-15 Published:2026-09-22

摘要: 规范行政执法、杜绝“逐利执法”,是推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的题中之义,也是优化区域营商环境、激发市场主体活力的重要制度保障。本文基于2016—2023年新三板中小企业数据以及城市层面罚没收入相关数据,实证分析了地方罚没收入依赖度上升对中小企业劳动雇佣规模的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,地方罚没收入依赖度上升将抑制中小企业的劳动雇佣规模。这一效应在非高新技术、非“专精特新”和小微类型的企业中以及在期初高财政压力或高罚没执法强度地区更明显。为应对此类非预期负担,企业倾向于解聘生产岗位的员工和低学历的员工。机制分析发现,地方罚没收入依赖度上升不利于区域营商环境优化,具体表现为抬高中小企业的制度性交易成本、加剧其融资约束并削弱其经营预期,从而抑制中小企业劳动雇佣规模扩大。拓展研究发现,罚没收入治理改革能显著扩大中小企业的劳动雇佣规模。本文研究结论为新发展阶段加快推动有效市场与有为政府有机结合、优化营商环境和支持中小微企业健康发展,提供了新的研究视角和决策参考。


关键词: 罚没收入依赖, 营商环境, 劳动雇佣, 罚没收入治理改革

Abstract: Standardizing administrative law enforcement and eliminating “profitmotivated enforcement” are inherent requirements for modernizing government governance systems and capacities They also serve as crucial institutional guarantees for optimizing the regional business environment and stimulating market vitality Against the backdrop of sustained growth in local penalty revenue in China, this study employs data on Small and Mediumsized Enterprises (SMEs) listed on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ) and citylevel penalty revenue data from 2016 to 2023 It systematically investigates the impact of increased reliance on local penalty revenue on the regional business environment and the employment scale of SMEs
The findings indicate that higher reliance on local penalty revenue significantly suppresses the labor employment scale of SMEs. This inhibitory effect is more pronounced among nonhightech enterprises, non“specialized, refined, distinctive, and innovative” enterprises, small and micro enterprises, as well as in regions with greater initial fiscal pressure and higher intensity of penalty law enforcement Furthermore, when burdened with such unanticipated
costs, firms tend to cut productionrelated jobs and reduce employees with lower educational attainment Mechanism analysis reveals that an increased reliance on local penalty revenue impedes the optimization of the regional business environment Specifically, it raises institutional transaction costs for SMEs, exacerbates their financing constraints, and weakens their business expectations, thereby collectively inhibiting their labor employment scale Extended analysis shows that governance reforms targeting penalty revenue help expand SMEs employment scale
The contributions of this paper are threefold First, it provides new empirical evidence on the microeconomic effects of the expansion of local penalty revenue While existing literature has primarily discussed its potential economic impacts through normative analysis, empirical evidence on how it affects market entities remains limited Second, from the perspective of local governments “profitmotivated enforcement”, this paper incorporates the institutional burden stemming from increased penalty revenue dependence into the theoretical and empirical framework of corporate labor employment This not only deepens the understanding of the antecedents and mechanisms of SMEs employment behavior but also offers a new analytical perspective for understanding how the institutional environment shapes such behavior Third, this paper examines the heterogeneous effects of increased penalty revenue reliance across different types of firms, job positions, and workers with varying educational backgrounds It also verifies the employmentpromoting effect of penalty revenue governance reforms. The findings provide important policy implications for constructing a governance system that synergizes “standardized law enforcement” with “stimulating market vitality”


Key words: dependence on penalty revenue, business environment, labor hiring, penalty revenue governance reform